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Introduction. 
A. Background and objectives. 
Undertaking research pertaining to the conduct of warfare in the Caucasus is a very 
challenging task as it requires reference to historical events that took place decades and even 
centuries ago, and involves very complex ethnic questions of the neighboring nations, which 
includes territorial claims that,- ipso facto have fuelled ethnic hatred in the region.  
This thesis is dedicated to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh (hereafter NK) between 
Azerbaijan and Armenia. The territory that today comprises NK, as a bridge between Black and 
Caspian Seas, has been a transit and settlement zone for multiple ethnic groups for many 
centuries. Coexistence of those groups was accompanied by constant territorial claims and 
conflicts, which has been exacerbated due to ambiguity surrounding the arrival - in terms of time 
and scope - of separate ethnic groups in the given area, and their specific settlement zones within 
the region (today the Caucasus still represents a home for 50 different ethnic groups)
1
.  
Even in the etymology of the name of the region, crossbreeding of cultures can be 
discerned; where “Karabakh” is a Turkish-Persian fusion, translated as “Black Garden”, 
“Nagorno” is the Russian word for “mountainous”2. While confrontations between the two 
nations - Azerbaijan and Armenia - existed throughout history, existence within the USSR as 
part of the one State temporarily calmed down tensions. Nonetheless tensions later erupted 
violently in the struggle for this contested region of NK, belonging to Azerbaijan, but populated 
at that time by an Armenian ethnic majority. 
This thesis researches the legal regulation of the conflict in NK, from the time of the 
area’s incorporation within Soviet Union, through to its transformation into two independent 
states (upon dissolution of the USSR). The objective of the paper is to illustrate how global 
historical transitions affected the application of the legal regime in terms of the conflict, and its 
respective rules pertaining to the protection of civilians. In doing so, I will elaborate on 
applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL) in the conflict, identifying, firstly, whether 
the confrontations which have taken place amounted to the armed conflict (AC) proper, since 
only existence of AC generates necessity for the IHL’s legal regulation. This analysis will be 
                                                          
1
 H.Kruger, The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. A Legal Analysis, p.1-2. 
2
 De Waal, “Black Garden”, p.8. 
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undertaken through elaborating on the concept of AC, and examining how the concept of AC 
applies to the facts on the ground. Secondly, my analysis will demonstrate how the changing 
nature of the conflict affected the legal protection enjoyed by civilians. 
Overall this thesis is inspired by the fact that the war in NK was little known in the 
international arena, while the AC’s in Yugoslavia, occurring at the same time, received much 
attention. The war in NK resulted in heinous violations of fundamental rights and was considered 
one of the bloodiest conflicts in the post-Soviet area, - resulting in thousands of deaths and 
millions of refugees. Nevertheless the conflict is still unresolved, as is the status of the occupied 
territories (NK region and neighboring areas). While conflicts in former Yugoslavia were 
addressed by ICTY – which was established to investigate violations of IHL and international 
criminal law (ICL), prosecute and bring to justice perpetrators of various crimes, thus, 
contributing to restoration of the peaceful coexistence of nations after those disastrous events; 
none of this was done in relation to the NK conflict. Being personally from Azerbaijan, this 
situation of no legal justice is very frustrating. Therefore, this thesis attempts to assess the legal 
regime through the development of the conflict and analyze its affects in relation to protected 
persons. The author understands and acknowledges that violations of IHL and fundamental rights 
were committed by both parties to the conflict; nevertheless the scope of this thesis is to examine 
the failures and violations committed by Armenian side and protections enjoyed by Azeri 
civilian population in the conflict.  
B. Structure. 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter one gives an introductory overview of 
IHL, pointing out the main tenets of the development of the discipline, its principles and sources. 
Chapter two seeks to give understanding of the concept of AC’s (with its constitutive elements) 
in its different typologies, with reference to the corresponding legal regimes, pertaining to the 
different types of AC’s, as codified today in IHL instruments – in the Geneva Conventions (GC) 
and Additional Protocols (AP), and developed further by jurisprudence and scholarly opinions. 
Chapter three gives an overview of the history of the region and development of the conflict 
from its USSR era through to its post-dissolution period. Chapter four analyses the tenets of AC 
and its constituent elements in relation to the confrontations in NK, with conclusions on the 
nature of the hostilities in each particular periods, from its USSR development and post-USSR 
escalation. Chapter five provides analysis of how the changed nature of the AC affected the legal 
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protection enjoyed by civilians; reference is made to the IHL customary and conventional rules 
on protection of civilians and other various concepts of international law, with concluding 
remarks on the nature of ultimate character of the protection.  
C. Methodology. 
In answering the research question a mix of methodologies will be used in this thesis. 
One of the methodologies will be theoretical implying reference to scholarly opinions and the 
main developments regarding the issues discussed. Qualitative method will be applied, using 
techniques such as case studies, interviews, and observations. In this regard reference will be 
given to international jurisprudence, mainly of ICTY. Doctrinal research or “black-letter law” 
approach will be applied in relation to the provisions and norms of international instruments, 
Geneva Convention’s and Additional Protocol’s, where legal interpretation and explanation of 
the provisions therein constitutes a special part in conducting this research. Reference to other 
disciplines, such as history, political science, sociology, also will be made, thereby making this 
research interdisciplinary. Finally, throughout the whole paper, international and comparative 
legal analysis will be applied by using findings, mainly, of the ICTY in relation to the NK 
conflict. These research methodologies will help in answering the research question posed in this 
thesis.  
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Chapter 1: What is IHL and Why We Need It?  
In the situation of AC application of the rules and norms of IHL is of a genuine 
importance. This application, supposedly, makes the conflict regulation easier and conduct of the 
armed activities per se became pure from illegal violence and following the letter of law within 
the considered discipline.  
1.1 What is IHL? Tenets and principles. 
 Law of hostilities- or IHL comprises the whole of established law serving protection of a 
man in AC (the concept of AC will be considered in the following chapter). It applies with equal 
force to all parties in an AC, irrespective of which party initiated that conflict
3
. Dinstein 
stipulated: “Almost by definition, {IHL} entails human losses, suffering and pain….The law of 
{IAC} can and does forbid some modes of behavior, with a view to minimizing the losses, the 
suffering and the pain…”4.  
 Kolb stipulates that IHL can be defined as a branch of Public International Law (PIL), 
which limits the use of violence in AC’s by: 
1)sparing those who do not or no longer directly participate in hostilities; 
2)limiting the violence to the amount necessary to achieve the aim of the conflict - only to 
weaken the military potential of the enemy
5
.  
Today’s IHL protects persons not directly participating in active hostilities and provides 
protection to the bigger audience of the enemy nation than it did before, when it only covered 
professional armies of the belligerents
6
. In the evolution of IHL main principles were established 
(principle of necessity (or principle of limitation) and principle of humanity) reflecting the core 
of the discipline and today they are expressed in the following principles: 
- The principle of distinction- requires distinction at all times between belligerents and 
civilians, and between military objectives and civilian objects;  
                                                          
3
 D.Fleck, The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, p.1. 
4
 Y.Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, p.1.   
5
 R.Kolb, An Introduction to the International Law of Armed Conflicts, p.15.  
6
 Ibid, p.29-33. 
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- The principle of necessity- requires adoption of the measures which are only 
necessary to overpower the enemy and bring him to surrender, what is the main 
purpose of AC;  
- The principle of proportionality- requires that all measures taken by belligerents 
should be commensurable with the aims parties seek to achieve in the conflict. In this 
context proportionality means that military advantage gained in any operation should 
outweigh the damage caused to civilians and civilian objects during that operation
7
.   
Those principles, besides being codified in the treaty law, were also authoritatively 
restated by International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its Advisory Opinion (AO) on Nuclear 
Weapons case, highlighting its established nature as customary norms
8
.  
1.2 Sources of IHL. 
 According to the Statute of ICJ there are following sources of international law: 
international conventions, international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law, general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the highly qualified publicists
9
.    
1.2.1 International custom. 
Customary international law (CIL) represents unwritten rules, developed through general 
state practice and “accepted as law”. There are distinguished objective and subjective elements 
of the custom, where objective relates to the general practice of States, while subjective (opinio 
juris- or legal opinion) could be inferred from the wording “accepted as law”, representing 
motivation of those who are supposed to follow a custom, considering it obligatory way of 
behavior. Latin expression – opinio juris sive necessitatis, meaning “…a belief that this practice 
is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it”10 –serve as clarification of 
the concept.   
State practice consists of actual conduct (acts of commission or omission) and 
declarations and statements of States. Furthermore term “general practice” should not be 
confused with universal, meaning that not every State needs to participate in emergence of a 
particular norm, nonetheless once that norm was solidified as part of customary law- it is binding 
                                                          
7
 Ibid., p.43-49.  
8
 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, AO, ICJ Reports 1996, para.77-78.  
9
 ICJ Statute, Art. 38 (1).  
10
 North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, Para.77. 
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on all States
11
. The importance of customary rules and norms was also emphasized through the 
expression in treaty law: “In cases not covered by … international agreements, civilians and 
combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law 
derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public 
conscience”12.  
1.2.2 International treaties. 
 A treaty-is an agreement, concluded between States in written form and governed by 
international law
13
, where States express their consent to be parties and to be bound by 
provisions thereof.  
Treaties could be expressive of already existing customary rules, codifying them, where 
those States, which did not become party to such treaties, still obliged to fulfill provisions thereof 
due to their customary nature; in this way customary law fills in the gaps in legal regulation
14
. 
1.2.3 International treaties related to AC’s. 
Rules, pertaining to the conduct of war, could be found already in ancient laws: the 
“Code of Hammurabi”; in the special orders of Cyrus I, King of the Persians from 7th century 
BC; the Laws of Manu and etc.
15
 Nevertheless proper developments and codifications appeared 
much later and can be discerned from St Petersburg Declaration from 19
th
 century and further on 
in the development of the Hague and Geneva Law.    
The Hague Conventions from 1899 and 1907 presented multiply facets of conduct of 
hostilities on land, sea and air, among which HC IV of 1907 had become the mirror of customary 
law, as reiterated by Nuremberg Tribunal and Tribunal for the Far East
16
. The Hague law 
regulated questions of the means and methods of warfare, and of the rights and duties of 
belligerents in occupied territories. 
Geneva Conventions (GC’s), also known as “Red Cross Conventions” were adopted and 
revised in 1864, 1906, 1929, and finally in 1949 the Four Conventions, existing today, were 
adopted, dealing with the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field (Convention I), 
wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea (Convention II), prisoners of 
                                                          
11
 Dinstein, p.5-6. 
12
 AP I, art.1(2).  
13
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, Art.2(1)(a). 
14
 Dinstein, p.9. 
15
 Fleck, p.16. 
16
 Dinstein, p.9-11. 
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war (Convention III), and protection of civilians (Convention IV). Moreover those Conventions 
were complemented by Additional Protocols (AP’s), where Protocol I relates to IAC’s and 
Protocol II to NIAC’s17.  
Now two sets of law (The Hague and Geneva Law) are regarded as the one united field of 
international law- IHL, what was confirmed by ICJ: “These two branches of the law applicable 
in armed conflict have become so closely interrelated that they are considered to have gradually 
formed one single complex system, known today as {IHL}”18. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17
 Ibid. 
18
 See supra note 8, para.75.   
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Chapter 2: Typology of Armed Conflicts. 
Existence of an AC deems application of the rules and principles of IHL necessary, 
regardless of the nature of a conflict. The crucial moment is distinction of an AC from the 
internal tensions and disturbances, to which IHL is not relevant, since mentioned events are 
regulated by the norms of domestic law and separate regime of International Human Rights Law.  
This tendency was developed in previous centuries when recognition of belligerency 
triggered application of the laws of war
19
. The act of recognition signified that violence gained 
such a sustained level that both sides were entitled to be treated in the same way as belligerents 
in an IAC.  
2.1 A brief typology of AC’s. 
Although IHL’s aim is the limitation of the effects of AC’s, it does not fully define what 
constitutes AC’s in its existent treaty law. While relevant conventions refer to various types of 
AC’s and therefore render some understanding of the legal regimes in different situations of 
hostilities, these instruments don’t offer precise criteria of the content of the categories of the 
conflicts they refer to. Moreover there is not any structure or body in international arena, which 
pronounces on the nature of violence or AC, although ICJ pointed out that “mere frontier 
incident” did not represent “armed attack”20. 
Meanwhile proper understanding of those concepts is essential in order to determine what 
kind of situation we are facing and establish legal regime for that situation. In IHL there are 
distinguished two types of legal regimes, applicable to the situations of AC’s: regime pertaining 
to IAC’s and regime pertaining to NIAC’s. They have different in nature rules (rules governing 
conduct of IAC’s are more developed than treaty rules pertaining to NIAC’s, for example the law 
related to occupied territories is only developed in IAC’s; status of the parties is also different, 
where entitlement to combatant or prisoner of war (POW) status is not valid for the non-State 
party in NIAC’s21). Nevertheless an important common feature is that great majority of 
customary rules apply to both types of AC’s22.  In this respect interpretation of different 
categories of AC’s through international legal practice and recent developments in IHL seems 
necessary.  
                                                          
19
 For more detailed discussion see chapter 1 of L.Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict.  
20 Nicaragua v. USA, Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, para.195. 
21
 Kolb, p.69-70.  
22
 Ibid,p.80. 
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2.2 International Armed Conflicts (IAC’s). 
Legal regime, pertaining to IAC’s, has been progressively extended through development 
of treaty law. With adoption of the GC’s a broader approach, based on objective concept of AC, 
was introduced. Further extension was done with adoption of AP I in 1977, which added another 
type of conflict to the regime of IAC’s, namely wars of national liberation23. 
2.2.1 GC/API armed conflicts, including belligerent occupation. 
     Common Article (CA) 2(1) of GC’s applies to “all cases of declared war or of any other 
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the 
state of war is not recognized by one of them”24. In this way, IAC’s are conflicts, where two or 
more sovereign States are engaged, and formal declaration of existence of war is not required; 
thus, war can exist in technical sense (commencing with formal declaration of war by one State 
against another) or in material sense (when the comprehensive use of armed force in the relations 
between two States exist)
25
.  
 The concept of IAC’s is also developed in legal doctrine. D. Schindler stated, 
"…existence of an armed conflict within the meaning of {CA 2} can always be assumed when 
parts of the armed forces of two States clash with each other. […] Any kind of use of arms 
between two States brings the Conventions into effect”. H.-P. Gasser explains that "any use of 
armed force by one State against the territory of another, triggers the applicability of the {GC’s} 
between the two States. […] It is also of no concern whether or not the party attacked resists. 
[…] As soon as the armed forces of one State find themselves with wounded or surrendering 
members of the armed forces or civilians of another State on their hands, as soon as they detain 
prisoners or have actual control over a part of the territory of the enemy State, then they must 
comply with the relevant convention"
26
.  
According to ICRC “differences arising between two States and leading to the 
intervention of armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of article two, even if one 
of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war. It makes no difference how long the conflict 
lasts, or how much slaughter takes place”27. In light of these developments, concept of IAC and 
corresponding application of IHL was established in accordance with objective criteria of 
                                                          
23
 S.Vite, Typology of armed conflicts in international humanitarian law: legal concepts and actual situations, p.70. 
24
 CA 2 of GC’s, regulation of this category of AC’s is also retained in AP I, art.1(3).  
25
 Dinstein, p.15. 
26
 ICRC Opinion Paper, How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law?, p.2. 
27
 ICRC, Commentary to the GC I, p.32. 
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existence of AC on the ground, regardless of the will and determinations made by States, 
engaged in the hostilities
28
.  
In the following developments ICTY adopted general notion of IAC “an armed conflict 
exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States"
29
, which was further supported 
by international jurisprudence.  
i) Belligerent Occupation.  
Another category of IAC’s – occupation is regulated by CA 2 (2). The notion of 
occupation was defined in the Hague Convention IV (HC IV) from 1907, where article 42 
stipulated that “territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of 
the hostile army”. From this provision two conditions are inherited:  1) ability of the occupier to 
exercise effective control over a territory that does not belong to it; 2) lack of consent of the 
territorial State for this intervention. Under effective territorial control is implied a substitution of 
powers, when overthrown government lacks ability to exercise its authority, while occupying 
Power is in a position to fill that gap by exerting its own power. This is usually realized through 
the deployment of the enemy troops on the territory concerned, who impose the minimum level 
of stability. However in some cases, territorial control is not exercised directly by the occupation 
forces, but via a puppet government or another form of subordinate local power
30
. For such 
instances jurisprudence of ICTY presented a formula of foreign State’s ‘overall control’ of the 
local agents’ who actually exercising ‘effective control’ over the territory in question31. As for 
the criterion of consent, CA 2(2) highlighted that relevant rules apply even if the occupation 
“meets with no armed resistance”, what does not relate to the instances when power is seized as 
result of hostilities
32
.  
2.2.2 API conflicts, i.e., wars of national liberation. 
With adoption of AP I in 1977, IAC’s besides being presented by inter-State conflicts 
only, also included conflicts between government forces and some non-governmental groups. 
The Protocol extended its application to the situations of “armed conflicts in which peoples are 
                                                          
28
 Ibid., and ICRC, Opinion Paper, p.1.  
29
 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para.70. 
30
 S.Vite, Typology…,p.74. 
31
 ICTY, Blaskic TC Judgment, para.149. 
32
 Supra note 30. 
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fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the 
exercise of their right of self-determination…”33. 
The people’s right to self-determination was encompassed in the UN Charter, Declaration 
on the Principles concerning Friendly Relations, International Covenants on Human Rights by 
virtue of which “they freely determine their political status and freely pursue economic, social 
and cultural development”34. The question is what we understand under the term “people”? 
Although there is no definition in international law of what constitutes a people, it is important to 
point out to some criteria, which assist in recognizing a group as a people: defined territory, 
common language, culture or ethnic ties with a common sentiment of forming a people and a 
political will to live together as such. In other words, possession of common and distinctive 
elements, which serve as the bond between people, who belongs to this group, and something 
what separates them from the others
35
.    
As ICRC emphasized there must be an AC in which a people is struggling against 
colonial domination, alien occupation or a racist regime, where this struggle is taking place in 
order to exercise its right to self-determination
36
.  
2.2.3 “Internationalized” non-international armed conflicts. 
Intervention of the State in a previously existing internal conflict, for example when a 
foreign Power sends troops into a territory of another State to support a movement opposing the 
local government, by that internationalizing it, comprises situations of another type of IAC’s. 
Internalization of the conflict can also occur through intervention from a distance
37
, if the 
required level of control is achieved.  ICTY established “overall control” test, which is expressed 
as “control by a State over subordinate armed forces or militias or paramilitary units of an overall 
character (comprising more than the mere provision of financial assistance or military equipment 
or training). This requirement, however, does not go so far as to include the issuing of specific 
orders by the State, or its direction of each individual operation...” The Chamber stated that 
“overall control” is achieved when a foreign State “has a role in organizing, coordinating or 
planning the military actions of the military group, in addition to financing, training and 
                                                          
33
 AP I, Art. 1(4). 
34
 Art. 1(1) of ICPR and ICESCR. 
35
 ICRC, Commentaries on the AP’s, para.102-106. 
36
 Ibid., para.112. 
37
 ICTY, Tadic AC(h) Judgment, para.84.  
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equipping or providing operational support to that group”38. By this involvement goes beyond 
mere logistical support, but does not imply that everything done by the group is directed by the 
State from a distance (for example State do not need to plan all the operations, choose targets, 
give specific instructions concerning the conduct of military operations and etc. to the units).  
In the following developments of jurisprudence and doctrine “overall control” test was 
used as a mean of determining whether or not the conflict is international in nature
39
. 
⃰⃰  ⃰⃰  ⃰⃰ 
It is clear that IAC’s are generally governed by Four GC’s and by AP I, which 
complements and develops provisions of GC’s, where those treaties have almost universal 
application (194 State parties to GC’s and 171 to the AP I40). As was stipulated by S. Vite, the 
nature of conditions required for the existence of IAC’s (intensity of the hostilities and 
organization of the parties) should be evaluated freely. Level of intensity is very low, presuming 
that situations prescribed by treaties simply need to exist, without it being extended over time or 
for it to create a certain number of victims
41
; while organization of the parties, since reference is 
to the government forces of States, is already presumed to meet the requirement without 
necessity to carry out evaluations in each case
42
. 
 
2.3 Non-International Armed Conflicts (NIAC’s) 
In the legal doctrine, according to H.P. Gasser, NIAC’s are understood as:” armed 
confrontations that take place within the territory of a State between the government - on the one 
hand and armed insurgent groups on the other hand. […] Another case is the crumbling of all 
government authority in the country, as a result of which various groups fight each other in the 
struggle for power”43. 
2.3.1 AP II Conflicts. 
AP II applies to NIAC’s and is the first document to define NIAC’s as “…armed 
conflicts … which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed 
forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible 
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command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out 
sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol”44. 
NIAC’s within the meaning of AP II can only exist if the situation attains a degree of 
violence that distinguishes it from cases of internal tensions or disturbances
45
. Nonetheless APII 
defines a more limited field of application than that of Common Article (CA) 3, it requires non-
governmental forces to have a particularly high level of organization, in the sense that they must 
be placed “under responsible command’ and exercise territorial control, allowing them ‘to carry 
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol”46. In this way 
Protocol “develops and supplements {CA 3} without modifying its existing conditions of 
application…”47, thus CA 3 has lower threshold, as it does not pose conditions set in AP II, 
where two treaties keep their autonomy and exist independently.  
AP II also restricts its field of application only to AC’s between governmental forces on 
one side and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups on another
48
.  
Under AP II the element of protraction was modified and formed in the higher threshold 
of “sustained and concerted military operations”, still implying duration and intensity but on a 
more objective basis
49
.  
AP II definition clearly imposes territorial control, while case law suggests that territorial 
control is not a requirement for existence of AC
50
. Meanwhile ICRC stipulates that this control 
could be “relative” and requires that armed groups are organized in such a way as to enable them 
to allow sustained and concerted military operations and application of the Protocol
51
.  
On the concept of responsible command, ICRC speculated about some degree of 
organization of armed group, which does not mean hierarchical system of military organization, 
pertaining to regular armed forces. This implies that command should be capable of planning and 
carrying out sustained and concerted military operations and imposing discipline
52
.   
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Lastly under ability to carry out sustained and concerted military operations was 
understood to have persistent and continuing operations, which are planned and agreed upon, 
what means could be undertaken only by organized groups
53
.  
Generally, the last three requirements represent conditions pertaining to the notion of 
organization of the armed group.  
2.3.2 CA 3 Conflicts. 
CA 3 of the GCs which applies in the case of “armed conflict not of an international 
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties”54 for the first time laid 
down the rules, which parties supposed to observe during NIAC’s. As was clarified by ICTY 
jurisprudence, NIAC’s (within CA 3) are those in which at least one of the parties involved is not 
governmental, where hostilities take place either between one (or more) armed group(s) and 
government forces or solely between armed groups
55
. The significance of CA 3 is expressed 
through its application only to situations, which reached the level of AC’s and thus crossed the 
thresholds of less serious forms of violence, namely “situations of internal disturbances and 
tensions”56. In this respect ICTY’s TC went on to say that in “an armed conflict of an internal or 
mixed character, these closely related criteria {intensity of the violence and organization of the 
parties to the conflict} are used solely for the purpose, as a minimum, of distinguishing an {AC} 
from banditry, unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activities, which are not 
subject to IHL”57. In this respect, it is of necessity to establish relevant level of intensity, which 
is higher in this matter, than required for establishment of IAC’s, and refer to the organization of 
the parties to the conflict to qualify for an AC within the framework of CA 3. The jurisprudence 
of ICTY reveals that every time when situation can be defined as “protracted armed violence” it 
satisfies the threshold of intensity.   
i) Intensity of the conflict or protracted violence: 
Tadic Decision firstly pronounced on the element of protraction of the violence and was 
further supported in the following jurisprudence
58
. Evaluations whether internal armed violence 
is “protracted” or not, are realized by reference to the entire period - from initiation to cessation 
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of hostilities. ICTY stipulated that most instances of internal strife satisfy the requirement, 
whereas ICTR’s jurisprudence even established that armed violence extending over only a few 
months satisfied the “protracted” requirement within Tadic’s definition and by this within 
framework of CA 3
59
.  
Following criteria of protraction/intensity of armed hostility were mentioned in the 
jurisprudence: increase in armed clashes and seriousness of attacks (for ex. killing of people who 
were employed by the police or cooperated with them)
60
; spread of clashes over the territory and 
period of time
61
; increase in the number of government forces sent against non-governmental 
groups and mobilization and distribution of weapons, such as rifles, guns and mortals
62
. 
Importance is given also to the attention of the UN SC and adoption of the resolutions on the 
matter
63
; or more general indications of intensity such as number of civilians fleeing the combat 
zones, general extent of material destruction, usage of heavy weapons and military equipment’s 
such as tanks, number of casualties etc.
64
 Factors such as blocking or besieging of towns and 
their shelling; the quantity of troops and units deployed; the occupation of towns and villages; 
deployment of government forces to the crisis area; the closure of roads; attempts of 
representatives from international organizations to broker and enforce cease fire agreements
65
. 
It is important to emphasize that these assessments help establish whether threshold of 
intensity has been reached; the mentioned conditions need not to exist concurrently
66
.  
ii) Organization of the parties: 
In the sense of CA 3 the parties to NIAC are either government forces on the one side and 
organized armed group/s on another or both sides could be armed groups confronting each other. 
While CA 3 does not define parties to the conflict it applies to “each party to the conflict”, 
implying that its provisions are binding on a non-signatory Party. In this way the mere fact of 
existence of AC requires application of the CA 3
67
.  
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ICRC speculated about the “minimum degree of organization and discipline (of an armed 
group opposing a government) - in order to be recognized as a party to the conflict”. Moreover 
ICRC emphasized that, if a State resorts to the use of force against the rebels, they could qualify 
as a party to the conflict
68
. Minimum level of organization was reiterated in various reports of the 
different specialized commissions and international organizations
69
. 
TC in Limaj commented on the degree of organization where it “need not be the same as 
that required for establishing the responsibility of superiors for the acts of their subordinates 
within the organization…”70. TC in Boskoski restated necessity of “some degree of 
organization”, where “warring parties do not necessarily need to be as organized as the armed 
forces of a State, nor the degree of organization for an armed group to a conflict to which {CA 
3} applies need be at the level of organization required for parties to{AP II AC’s}…”71. 
While Tadic Decision pointed out to the organizational requirement of the group it did 
not elaborate on the matter
72
. Further clarifications of the notion were developed by following 
jurisprudence. In the Milosevic Decision TC pointed out to the following criteria of the 
organization of the non-governmental party: official joint command structure; headquarters; 
designated zones of operation; ability to procure, transport and distribute arms
73
. Limaj and 
Boskoski judgments emphasized the following features: existence of the General Staff in the first 
place and appointment by them of zone commanders; existent chain of command where Staff 
issues various directions and public statements to different units on behalf of the organization 
and unit commanders give combat orders to subordinate units and soldiers, who act in 
accordance; capacity to control part of the territory; introduction of the system of disciplinary 
rules and military police; recruitment, training and equipment of new volunteers; usage of 
artillery mortals and rocket launchers. Recognition by international representatives of non-
governmental armed group as necessary party in the political negotiations, with ability to 
negotiate and conclude cease-fire agreements or peace accords
74
.  
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Among other features in some cases were highlighted additional criteria of organization 
under civilian authority prepared to observe laws of war, although this was not a requirement for 
existence of AC
75
. 
It is necessary to clarify that criteria mentioned above as indicative of the concepts of 
intensity of violence and organization of the parties are exemplary and “requires a case-specific 
analysis of the facts “or should be determined on the case by case basis76.  
2.3.3 Situations falling short of NIAC’s. 
 When criteria comprising AC (intensity and organization) are absent, occurring 
confrontations are referred to as short of AC or constituting internal disturbances or tensions. 
These concepts present types of social instability, which have never been defined in law, 
although reference to those situations exists in AP II
77
. In background documents for drafting AP 
II, ICRC considered that internal disturbances are situations in which “there is no {NIAC} as 
such, but there exists a confrontation within the country, which is characterized by a certain 
seriousness or duration and which involves acts of violence {which} can assume various forms, 
all the way from the spontaneous generation of acts of revolt to the struggle between more or less 
organized groups and the authorities in power. In these situations, which do not necessarily 
degenerate into open struggle, the authorities in power call upon extensive police forces, or even 
armed forces, to restore internal order…”78. As for internal tensions, they cover less violent 
circumstances of political, racial or other nature, involving, for example, mass arrests, a large 
number of ‘political’ detainees, torture or other kinds of ill-treatment, forced disappearance 
and/or the suspension of fundamental judicial guarantees. As ICRC summarized, there are 
internal disturbances, without being an AC, when a State uses armed force to maintain order; 
there are internal tensions, without being internal disturbances, when force is used as a 
preventive measure to maintain respect for law and order. Both concepts are not falling under 
regulation of IHL; nevertheless they are covered by framework of Human Rights Law (HRL)
79
.    
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2.4 Nature of CA 3. 
CA 3 is like a “Convention in miniature”, which applies to the situations of NIAC’s and 
ensures the application of the rules of humanity, which are recognized as essential by civilized 
nations. Furthermore additional advantage of the text of the article is that it applies 
automatically, without any condition of reciprocity
80
. CA 3 now reflects minimum standards 
applicable in any AC, whatever its classification
81. ICJ stated that “Article 3…defines certain 
rules to be applied in the {NIAC’s}. There is no doubt that, in the event of {IAC}, these rules 
also constitute a minimum yardstick… and they are rules which, in the Court's opinion, reflect 
"elementary considerations of humanity"
82
. By this, CA 3 became a baseline from which no 
departure, under any circumstances, is allowed
83, what highlights article’s customary nature.  
2.5 Developments in jurisprudence and treaty law. 
The first definition of AC was made in 1995 in the Tadic Decision “… {AC} exists 
whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a 
State…”84. 
In the following jurisprudence Tadic definition was referred to as a ‘criterion’ applicable 
to “all conflicts whether international or internal”85 and as a test of application of CA 3. 
Elements of AC, as propounded in Tadic, were further reiterated in the following ICTY 
jurisprudence: in Delalic
86
; in Kordic and Cerkez
87
and numerous other cases. Moreover those 
requirements were echoed in ICTR jurisprudence: Akayesu case
88
; Rutaganda case
89
 and etc.  
Furthermore Tadic definition was incorporated in the ICC Statute, which defined NIAC’s 
as “{AC’s} that take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted {AC} between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups”90. This definition 
established a field of application that is stricter than of CA 3 (with requirement of protraction), 
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however, broader than of APII, as it does not require armed group(s) to exercise territorial 
control, therefore standing in a half way between those categories
91
.  
From the developments in jurisprudence and treaty law, we see that Tadic formula was 
widely utilized in the following ICTY, ICTR and other jurisprudence, and in the reports of 
independent experts, international commissions of enquiry and various manuals on the law of 
AC’s. Moreover further codification of this threshold in the Rome Statute point out to the 
customary nature of those criteria
92
.  
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Chapter 3: Historical Overview. 
 
 Introduction to the general history is necessary as it gives understanding of the legal 
claims and argumentation of the parties, as well understanding of the causes of the conflict.  
3.1 Early history and roots of the conflict. 
There are two different versions (Armenian and Azeri) in the ancient history, each 
claiming belonging of NK region to their respective territories
93
. From the 7
th
 century discussed 
territories were under various occupations: Arab, Mongolian, Turkic, Persian control were 
respectively established here. Caucasus area from the 16
th
 century was experiencing 
confrontations between great powers of Persian, Ottoman and Russian empires, which 
significantly affected territorial and demographic delimitations of the region.   
In the 19
th
 century todays Azerbaijan and Armenia were partitioned into Khanates 
(Karabakh, Baku, Nakhjivan, Yerevan and etc.), semi-independent principalities
94
, where 
between 16 and 19
th
 centuries Karabakh and Yerevan were dominated by Muslims 
(approximately 117,000 of Azerbaijanis and Kurds in 1820
th
,
 
while 8.4% of Armenians lived in 
Karabakh in 1823
95
); and in the southern Caucasus Muslim majority constituted 80%, while 
Armenians represented 20% of the total population.  
As a result of the first Russo-Persian war in 1812-13, the treaty of Gulistan was 
concluded, which officially transferred Karabakh from Persian to Russian rule; nevertheless 
confrontations between empires continued, leading to the second Russo-Persian war with 
repeated defeat for Persians, culminating in conclusion of Turkmenchay treaty in 1828. This 
treaty strengthened Russian control in the region and provided for a resettlement of Armenians 
from Persia and Ottoman Empire to the Caucasus, where in Azerbaijan they were resettled in 
Karabakh, Zangezur and Nakhjivan areas. Respectively large number of Muslim population of 
the region left for the territories under Persian or Ottoman control. According to Russian census 
reports, Armenians in Karabakh reached their majority of 53% in 1880; in Yerevan 53.8% in 
1832
96
.  
The process of population exchanges accelerated after every Russo-Turkish war (1853-56 
an 1876-78) since Russians saw Azeris as generally unreliable and as potential allies to the 
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Turks, given their ethno-linguistic affinities; in contrast Armenians were seen as Russia’s natural 
allies, devoted and reliable for the Emperor
97
. It was assumed that between 500,000 and 700,000 
Armenians migrated to the South Caucasus, mainly to Yerevan and NK, during and after the 
wars with Ottomans, what increased the number of Armenians in the territories to 900,000 by the 
end of the 19
th
 century
98
.  
Tensions in the beginning of the 20
th
 century resulted in inter-ethnic clashes in the 
territories of Baku, Ganja, Nakhjivan, Karabakh and Yerevan. Attempts to create statehood and 
gain independence were made, and in May of 1918 Azerbaijani Democratic Republic (ADR) and 
later on Armenian Democratic Republic (ArDR) were proclaimed, although the latter at the time 
did not have its own territory. Later on ADR yielded Yerevan to ArDR and Dashnaks (members 
of The Armenian Revolutionary Federation party) started to displace Muslim population out of 
the Nakhjivan, Karabakh and Yerevan regions, which they saw as historically Armenian
99
. 
Nevertheless those republics did not enjoy their independence for long and were forcefully 
included into USSR in the 1920-21. 
In the first years after establishing Soviet rule territorial delimitations took place: 
Karabakh and Nakhjivan were left to Azerbaijan SSR, while Zangezur was transferred to 
Armenian SSR; NK was granted an autonomous status and was called Nagorno-Karabakh 
Autonomous Oblast (NKAO), with majority of ethnic Armenians within Azerbaijani SSR; 
Nakhjivan also received status of an Autonomous Republic within Azerbaijan. Despite all those 
determinations Armenians continued their struggle for control over NKAO and Nakhjivan and 
constant attempts were made by sending off various petitions to the central authorities in 
Moscow; moreover Armenian leaders (in Armenian SSR and NK region) started voicing their 
demands for the unification of NK and Armenia, leading to constant tensions between two soviet 
republics during Soviet period and after
100
.  
3.2 Outbreak of new territorial claims and rise of ethnic hostility. 
At the end of 80
th
 nationalist movements across USSR increased and conflict over NK 
escalated with a new force. The activation of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia 
started with mass demonstrations and political rallies, multiple resolutions from Armenian side 
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in NK (Stepanakert), in Armenia (Yerevan), where representatives of Armenian intelligentsia, 
parliamentary and working class were demanding territorial annexation of NK to Armenia. 
Moscow rejected all petitions and claims for incorporation and dispatched motorized battalion of 
Soviet Interior Ministry to the region
101
. Azerbaijani side also started protesting, and on 22 of 
February of 1988 in NK in interethnic clashes between villagers two Azeri men were killed. 
Moreover during this period a case of rapes in Stepanakert of two Azeri girls was registered
102
.  
However, the first clashes took place already in 1987, in the small village Chardakhlu, 
north of Azerbaijan, and was followed by demonstrations and new clashes in Armenia, Kafan 
and Meghri, what resulted in the total expulsion of Azeri civilians from those villages. Witnesses 
testify that the first refugees arrived to Baku in November 1987 and in January 1988
103
. 
Appearance of the first refugees triggered pogroms and violent deportations of population from 
both sides: of ethnic Armenian residents from Azerbaijan and ethnic Azerbaijani residents from 
Armenia. One of the most brutal considered Sumgait (Azerbaijani city) pogrom, taking place in 
February of 1988, where the number of killed reached thirty-two, with twenty six of Armenian 
ethnicity and six of Azeri, with hundreds of wounded, what resulted in almost total removal of 
ethnic Armenian population from the city
104
.  
In May 1988 Armenian proposals of creating NK Autonomous Republic were rejected by 
Moscow, leading to another wave of clashes and flow of refugees from Stepanakert, Yerevan and 
other populated by ethnic Azeri’s territories. As was expressed by De Waal: “… Armenians 
turn{ed} against their Azerbaijani minority and expel{led} them from Armenia …gangs raided 
Azerbaijani villages; many of their residents were beaten, shot, had their homes burned, or were 
forced to flee on foot… and dozens of Azerbaijanis had died in a savage...”. Researches indicate 
the total death rate of 216 (who was murdered and died while fleeing)
105
.  
Displacements with participation of local authorities were common: in Spitak region 
(North Armenia) in November 1988 local officials ordered Azeri population to leave, upon 
refusal to obey, armed gangs were sent against them and population was deported via organized 
buses. It is considered that more than 200,000 Azeris and Muslim Kurds were expelled from the 
Armenian countryside. Another way of organized deportation of civilians was establishing by 
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both parties of the system of exchanges, where through the connections between party leaders 
and members of local authorities, both sides arranged conditions of “safe removal” of civilians. 
As for instance in Jermuk, from where 1000 Azeris fled by bus and train, and in return 700 
Armenians, fleeing Baku and Mingechaur, were settled
106
. 
Meanwhile Baku drowned in political struggle for power, leading to another round of 
clashes and triggering deployment of USSR Ministry of Interior (MVD) troops on the night of 
19-20 January of 1990, resulting in the death of more than 130 civilians
107
.  
According to Human Rights Watch (HRW) Report, alleged process of creation of 
paramilitary groups in NK led to massive operation, conducted in summer of 1991 by 
Azerbaijani authorities (Special Function Militia Troops-OMON) and Soviet army deployed in 
the region, leading to displacement of many ethnic Armenians
108
.  
3.3 Escalation to the war, occupation process. 
Azerbaijan and Armenia declared their independence from USSR and elected first presidents 
in August-October of 1991, what was followed by formal break-up of the USSR in December 
1991. New States formally inherited old borders, as within Union existence, thus NK was 
internationally recognized as territory of newly proclaimed Azerbaijan Republic. Meanwhile NK 
problem was not resolved and now according to De Waal, “Armenians risked international 
opprobrium by laying claim to a part of an independent country, they sidestepped this problem 
by declaring NK “independent”-thus no longer responsibility of Yerevan”. Local authorities of 
NK declared the independence of “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” from Azerbaijan on September 
1991 and conducted a referendum, in which Karabakh Azeris did not participate
109
. With 
dissolution of the USSR, Armenians and Azerbaijanis were left face to face, upon withdrawal of 
Soviet troops from the region.  
In the beginning of 1992 Armenians began advancement on Azeri populated cities and 
villages within NK. The city of Khojali was important, as it had regional airport what could 
establish direct connection with mainland Armenia. Khojali in 1991 had a population between  
6,300 and 7000 (according to De Waal and Cornell), nonetheless it was in blockade within NK, 
surrounded by Armenian villages and paramilitary forces, so the airport was the only mean of 
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communication with the rest of Azerbaijan for Azeris. It was considered that around 3000 (not 
conclusive number) civilians were still in the city in February of 1992, while the number of the 
present militiamen (self-defense groups and some OMON militiamen) in the city is unknown, 
according to different sources there were as few as 22 and as many as 200 men
110
.  
On the night of 25-26 February of 1992 Armenian assault, which was allegedly supported 
by ex-Soviet 366
th
 Regiment (all ex-soviet troops’ members, as well the one concerned, at the 
collapse of the USSR, became mercenaries and upon payment participated in different military 
operations and traded their weapons and equipment’s)111, began against town of Khojali (the 
author will not comment further on the character of the involvement of ex-soviet troops as this 
falls outside of the scope of this paper). Armed vehicles surrounded the town from three sides 
and entered the city. Civilians fled through the only left corridor, among which one of the 
groups, trying to reach the nearest Azeri city of Agdam, reached the outskirts of the Armenian 
village Nakhichevanik and encountered Armenian militiamen, subjecting them to the wall of 
gunfire. Those, who survived the shelling, later shared the details and their evaluations of how 
many died during that incident. Still, approximate numbers of how many died, was impossible to 
conclude, as the bodies remained in the non-reached zone controlled by Armenians
112
.   
According to the local religious leader in Agdam there were 477 registered dead on the 
first days after massacre. It was incomplete list, who was reported by their families and those, 
whose bodies were in the morgue in the local mosque; nonetheless it did not include those, who 
was considered missing and presumed dead, whose families were entirely annihilated, so there 
was nobody to report on their death
113
. There are several theories of how many people were 
considered killed: Azeri official investigation put the death toll over 600, western journalists, 
present at the time
114
, - between 400 and 500, human rights (HR) organizations have figures 
between 200 and 1000
115
.  
                                                          
110
 Ibid, p.170. 
111
 Ibid, p.167 and 201. 
112
 Ibid, p.169-172, also HRW, Bloodshed in the Caucasus, p.19-24. 
113
 Goltz, Azerbaijan Diary, p.130, it was also unofficially confirmed by the local, Agdam-based representative of 
the ICRC on the basis of the number of body bags supplied by them. 
114
 For more details reference to the sources as Thomas Goltz, ”Armenian Soldiers Massacre Hundreds of Fleeing 
Families”, The Sunday Times, 01/03/1992; Anatol Lieven, ”Corpses Litter Hills in Karabakh”, The Times, 
02/03/1992; ”The Face of a Massacre”, Newsweek, 16/03/1992; ”Massacre by Armenians”, The New York Times, 
03/03/1992; The Age, (Melbourne), 06/03/1992 is of great relevance.  
115
 HRW, Seven Years..., p.6, note 28.  
25 
 
The next assault, against city of Shusha took place on 8
th
 of May 1992, resulting in the 
fall of the city and in the death of approximately three hundred men. Mainly it was losses on 
Azeri side, according to some evaluations there were 58 Armenian and 200 Azeri losses
116
. This 
capture signified total occupation of NK region by Armenians. After, Armenians moved towards 
Lachin, situated just in the narrow corridor between NK and Armenia, and on 18
th
 of May 
captured the city, by that territorially connected NK to Armenia. This seizure was seizure of the 
Azerbaijani territory proper, as Lachin situated outside NK region. 
On 27
th
 of March 1993 Armenian offence against Kelbajar, city located on the North-
West between NK and Armenia, began. During a week 60.000 people fled, many civilians were 
taken hostages and killed. Fleeing civilians were targeted with Grads
117
 and machine guns, while 
the other part was trapped, as the only available route of escape was through a snowy road north, 
across Murov Mountains, where people simply perished from the cold (according to some 
sources around 200 people died while crossing the mountains). This resulted in a new wave of 
thousands of refugees. Upon acquisition of Kelbajar again direct territorial connection of 
Armenia and NK was established
118
. Armenians continued their advances and on 23
rd
 of July 
captured Agdam, which had around 50 000 population of Karabakh Azeris
119
.  
Armenian offence continued and during August-October of 1993 they seized southern 
provinces of Azerbaijan, bordering with NK and Republic of Iran: Fizuli, Jebrail, Qubatli and 
Zangelan, with its population 300 000, which was respectively displaced. This occupation caused 
new wave of refugees, who were trapped in the southern part of Azerbaijan between Araks River 
in south- border with Iran, Armenia from the west and Karabakh Armenian forces, coming from 
the North. They were forced to cross the river to get to Iran, many of whom drowned
120
.  In 
August ICRC reported about 60,000 displaced people from Fizuli and Jebrail region only
121
.  
Although during 1992-93 Azeri forces undertook several contra attacks, even gaining 
some advantages, those situations were fast reversed and from the beginning of 1994 Azeri 
forces were pushed back, while Armenians were capturing more villages, resulting in the new 
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flows of refugees. The final cease-fire agreement was enforced in May 1994, what put an end to 
an active combat. 
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Chapter 4: Defining factual circumstances of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 
relation to the law of armed conflicts. 
 From the historical summary of the conflict in NK we see that confrontations began at the 
end of 80
th
 (87-88) when both States were members of the USSR. In light of these facts 
assuming that hostilities obtained necessary level and crossed the threshold of AC, this conflict 
will be considered as being internal in nature, as it was initiated within USSR. Further on, 
through the development of the conflict, upon dissolution of the Union (in 1991), carried out 
armed hostilities, if satisfied the required level of intensity, ought to be classified within the 
framework of IAC’s, since at that period taking place between independent states.  
As discussed previously in chapter two, requirements of organization of the parties and 
intensity or protraction of violence were established as necessary criteria, in order to pronounce 
on the existence of AC of any nature.  In this way satisfaction of those requirements in NK, 
warrants application of the rules and principles of IHL in the case of conflict in NK.  
In this respect period of 1987-1991 will be assessed to determine whether hostilities of 
that period qualified as NIAC within framework of CA 3. The choice of this legal framework is 
due to customary nature of the article to apply “elementary considerations of humanity” in the 
case of NIAC’s; furthermore the threshold of application of this article is lower than of one, 
required under AP II. In this way establishment of the concepts of organization of the parties and 
intensity/protraction of armed violence will satisfy application of CA 3.  
In respect of period of 1992-1994 (after dissolution of the USSR and appearance of new 
independent States until final cease-fire agreement) assessments will be done to determine 
whether hostilities carried out in that period amounted to IAC within framework of GC’s.  
4.1 Determinations in respect of 1987- 1991. 
  As was described previously, increased confrontations between Azerbaijan and Armenia 
within USSR started with demonstrations and political rallies in Stepanakert (NK), Yerevan 
(Armenia), demanding secession of NK from Azerbaijan and its annexation to Armenia. Those 
demonstrations led to hostilities between different communities and resulted in ethnic clashes in 
NK region and cities and villages within Azerbaijan and Armenia. Moreover those 
confrontations were conducted with corresponding displacement of civilian population, residing 
in those territories. In this respect it is necessary to comment on the character of the violence in 
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this period, weather it reached necessary level of intensity or protraction; as well on the level of 
organization of the parties concerned. 
4.1.1 Intensity/protraction of violence: 
ICTR jurisprudence pronounced regarding notion of protraction, that violence extending 
over a view months satisfies criteria of protraction within CA 3. Thereby, consideration of the 
entire duration of violence in the period of 1987-1991, can be regarded as reaching the threshold 
of protraction, as propounded by ICTR. Nevertheless it is of necessity to comment on other 
features of the notion of intensity. Previous case law emphasized such criteria as, seriousness of 
attacks, increase of armed clashes, spread of clashes over the territory and time, quantity of 
government units and troops sent to the crisis area, mobilization and distribution of weapons, 
such as rifles, guns and mortals, usage of heavy weapons and military equipment’s such as tanks, 
number of casualties, number of civilians fleeing the combat zone and etc.
122
  
 Spread of clashes over territory was obvious, since it took place simultaneously in 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and NK region. Upon development of hostilities clashes also increased, 
dispatch of Soviet MVD troops to the region and respective republics took place continuously. 
Already in July 1988 MVD troops were sent to Yerevan to impose curfew
123
; HRW Report 
indicated that in January 1989 Moscow placed NK region under its direct rule through those 
troops, nevertheless clashes continued between ethnic groups and between those troops and local 
residents. On January 1990, roughly 17.000 additional MVD troops were sent to NK and to the 
Armenian-Azerbaijani border and simultaneously USSR troops stormed Baku in 19-20
th
 of 
January, where they used, according to HRW, brutal force against unarmed residents killing over 
hundred people
124
. By summer of 1990 Soviet military checkpoints had been set up on all roads 
within NK region. According to HRW, an estimated 115 attacks on law enforcement officials, 
military outposts and military patrols took place between January and May of 1991, during 
which weapons and military equipment was stolen by groups from both sides
125
. Interesting to 
mention description of situation - level of violence at that time, given by Soviet officials, “not a 
day went by without gunfire, explosives, mine blasts, arson and pogroms”126.  
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HRW also emphasized that there was an open flow of arms facilitating formation of 
paramilitary forces of self-defense of ethnic Armenians in NK
127
. De Waal pointed out to 
interviews, in which state agency workers from Yerevan acknowledged the process of the flow 
of weapons to the region. One of the examples describes efforts of some official (Muradian) in 
gaining weapons already in 1986, and further points out to a system, established by him, of 
acquisition and forwarding of various weapons to the region on regular basis. This led to the 
arming of all organizations in the region
128
. Also were emphasized tacit approval and support of 
those activities by senior party figures in Armenia
129
.  
As to the number of civilians fleeing, according to De Waal, by the end of 1988 - 200,000 
Azeris were displaced from Armenia
130
, where only in November of 1988 unofficial sources 
highlighted the biggest refugee flow, around 180,000 Armenians from Azerbaijan and 160,000 
Azeris from Armenia
131
. By the end of 1989 all remaining Azeris in Armenia were expelled
132
; 
where researches indicate that for period of 1988 the number of murdered reached 127 (who was 
beaten, burned or killed), while the total death toll reached the number of 216, including people 
who died while fleeing.
133
 
Violent clashes in 1987-1991 occurred continuously over wide territory (Azerbaijan, 
Armenia and NK), resulting in casualties, death, displacement of thousands of people. Presence 
of military troops from central authorities (Moscow) was continuous during the whole period; 
moreover mediation attempts were undertaken by foreign representatives and produced cease-
fire agreement in September 1991 between republican leaderships, which nonetheless was fragile 
and was violated in two months
134
. These facts, in my opinion, point out to the level of intensity, 
between Soviet republics, crossing the threshold required within framework of CA 3.  
4.1.2 Organization of the parties: 
It is possible to discern level of organization through the processes taking place during 
the period concerned, with the main reference to the processes of displacement, occurring 
continuously in the mentioned territories. Example of organization and realization of 
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displacement of ethnic Azeris from Spitak (Armenia) were carried out by KGB officials, local 
party boss and police chief
135
. The same applies to the established system of exchanges of 
civilian population, conducted by representatives of local authorities between two republics. 
According to De Waal, clashes in Sumgait in February 1988 were conducted by 
instigation and careful planning of the authorities, both local Azeri and central Moscow. In his 
work he suggests several conspiracy theories related to the events, which resulted in total 
removal of ethnic Armenians from the city
136
. Furthermore participation of local authorities in 
the clashes in January 1990 in Baku was described in the way of support (provision of detailed 
lists of persons of Armenian ethnicity, residing in Baku with their addresses) to the armed 
groups, who attacked local Armenian residents, or intentional non-interference of local police 
and soviet troops in the violent clashes
137
.      
Soviet officials, at the time present in NK region, admitted “The second half of 1989 
began with the handing out of weapons,” (said Volsky), and that led, as De Waal emphasized, to 
escalation of hostilities, as the process of formation of paramilitary groups on both sides went 
faster with reception of weapons, where tactics included disruption of the bridges, blockage of 
the roads, taking of the first hostages
138
. Central authorities tried to prevent this process as 
Gorbachev (president of the USSR) signed a decree “On the Prohibition of the Creation of 
Armed Formations” in 25 July 1990, which, as De Waal pointed out, was primary aimed at 
Armenia. In 1989 militia groups such as The Armenian Army of Independence (AAI) and The 
Armenian National Army (ANA) emerged, which together had two thousand men under arms, 
stolen or bought from Soviet bases
139
. Moreover one of the leaders of the groups became 
Armenia’s interior minister in 1991 and “helped {Karabakh} paramilitaries by giving them 
illicitly bought weapons and transport”140. HRW also emphasized this process in NK, which only 
increased clashes between Azeris and Armenians, leading to another massive operation, 
conducted by OMON-Azerbaijani Forces and Soviet troops, resulting in displacement and 
casualties of ethnic Armenians
141
.  
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Armenian Interior Minister at 1991 admitted in further interviews: “Because we had been 
forced to create everything in secret, invisibly, in spite of the Soviet authorities, everything that 
was created turned into an army”142. Moreover under Soviet legislation, Union Republics had the 
right to form their own special police forces, which were legalized paramilitaries, for Azerbaijan 
it was OMON and Armenia – OMOR143. 
Reports of HRW and researches, conducted by international correspondents, pointed out 
to: active participation of state agents of both republics in the processes of displacement and 
violent clashes, in their gaining of weapons and military equipment, to be dispatched to the 
region; the process of creation of paramilitary groups on both sides, with their corresponding 
arming; the establishment of zones of military checkpoints and constant presence of the military 
troops, sent from Moscow, engaged in numerous clashes throughout the whole territories 
concerned; the participation of republics’ armed forces in numerous operations and clashes 
(whose organization is already presumed as being State forces of Union Republics). All these 
developments (as level of organization is to be determined on case-by-case basis) indicate, in 
author’s opinion, the minimum level of organization (as stipulated by ICRC and ICTY)144.    
⃰⃰  ⃰⃰  ⃰⃰ 
In respect of these determinations, it is of my opinion that, hostilities during the period 
1987-1991 were of such nature, as qualifying for NIAC within CA 3. Violence which mainly 
occurred between Union Republics (Azerbaijan and Armenia, as expressed in clashes and 
displacement of ethnic minorities from respective territories), and in NK region, reached the 
level of AC (satisfying criteria of intensity and organization), nonetheless being members of the 
USSR those hostilities are to be regarded as NIAC. 
4.2 Determinations in respect of 1992-1994. 
With USSR’s dissolution, hostilities between independent states are to be regarded as 
IAC. Nevertheless the situation was complicated due to Armenia’s allegations that it was not 
engaged in the conflict, which was taking place between NK Armenians and Baku, by that 
presenting NIAC, and Armenia here was only a concerned neighbor.     
Upon official dissolution of USSR, Soviet troops withdrew from the territories, leaving 
and selling their weapons and military equipment to the parties, leaving paramilitary groups face 
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to face with each other (those of the troops which did not leave in the first months, participated 
in the operations on the different sides upon payment)
145
. From 1992 the conflict developed in 
the manner of occupation of villages and cities in NK region, with corresponding displacement 
of Karabakh Azeris from the area. Although during 1992-93 Azeri armed forces undertook 
several contra attacks, gaining some success, those instances were short lived. In this way the 
necessary attention should be given to the parties of those hostilities.  
Through the reading of HRW reports and investigations of correspondents we see that 
Azeri part was presented by OMON forces and paramilitary groups, acting together in military 
operations, supported by government and provided with weapons and heavy military equipment, 
by this, in author’s opinion, being qualified as armed forces of the State. The main concern is 
related to the representation of the Armenian party. At the beginning of occupation process, in 
1992, paramilitary forces, created in the early stages of NIAC in Armenia (as was described 
previously), were taking leading role in hostilities. Due to Armenia’s political allegations of non-
involvement, it was considered that those paramilitaries were Karabakhi armed groups, 
especially for the time of first attacks and operations.  In this way it is necessary to understand 
whether those armed forces were acting as Armenian armed forces or as Karabakhi forces.  
Therefore, it is important to refer to the interviews of high officials of Armenia, conducted by De 
Waal in the following years (2000) and indicated in his research.  
As Robert Kocharian (ex-president of Armenia) admitted “When [the Soviet] forces 
withdrew we were left one on one with Azerbaijan, one on one, but organized and having as a 
minimum three or four years of experience of underground activity”146. From interview with 
current president of Armenia Sarkisian “But I think the main point is something different. Before 
Khojali, the Azerbaijanis thought that they were joking with us, they thought that the Armenians 
were people who could not raise their hand against the civilian population. We were able to 
break that [stereotype]. And that’s what happened…”147. 
 From the interview with Armenian Defense Minister at 1992 “You can be sure that 
whatever we said politically, the Karabakh Armenian and Armenian army were united in military 
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actions. It was not important for me if someone was a Karabakhi or an Armenian”, he 
acknowledged that on several occasions he deliberately ordered Armenian military into action
148
. 
 The arming of both parties was done on official level, when, in May 1992, at the meeting 
in Tashkent (Uzbekistan), representatives of Armenia and Azerbaijan formally inherited vast 
amounts of Soviet weaponry, as their due from dividing Soviet army, where States acquired 220 
tanks, 220 other armed vehicles, 285 artillery pieces, and 100 combat aircrafts
149
.  
 It is necessary to refer to HRW investigation, regarding involvement of Armenia in the 
conflict. According to HRW, Armenia was supporting Karabakh forces since the beginning. The 
overt participation was revealed during occupation of Kelbajar, when bombardment came from 
the side of Armenia and soldiers, on the active duty in Armenian Republican forces, 
acknowledged transporting ammunition to the region for fighting. HRW concluded that 
Armenian Republican armed forces participated in the operations in Azerbaijan during 
December 1993, April and May 1994. Some captured POW’s, interviewed by HRW, told that 
they were enlisted in Armenia and sent for fighting in Karabakh, others told that they were 
participating in transportation of army soldiers to the front to Kelbajar, among whom some 
soldiers did not even know where they were sent
150
. Furthermore, it was pointed out that police 
members of the Republic of Armenia were sent to the occupied territories of Azerbaijan to 
perform police duties. From the interviews, conducted in the streets of Yerevan, HRW 
researchers found out that 30 percent of the soldiers, to whom they talked at random, were 
regular recruits from Armenian Army fighting in Karabakh
151
. HRW also highlighted increased 
requirements for draft in military in Armenia at the period concerned, with corresponding 
provision of obligatory military training for men at age between 25-45, and imposition of strict 
passport control, forbidding men leave the country without special permission. Some of the 
interviewed draftees told HRW that they were sent to Lachin and Kelbajar areas for fighting. 
Moreover workers of HRW on a single day counted 5 buses full of Armenian Army soldiers 
entering NK, holding around 300 men in all; when interviewing them, after first denials, 
commanders acknowledged that they were heading to NK, since “it was their land and needed to 
be defended”. HRW pointed out that many other international correspondents witnessed the 
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similar situations of the flow of army to the region
152
. In this respect HRW concluded that 
Armenian army troops’ involvement in Azerbaijan makes Armenia a party to the conflict and 
makes the war an IAC between these states
153
. 
According to Cornell over 85 % of the budget of Karabakh was provided by government 
of Armenia, which spent 5-10% of its national income on Karabakh
154
. Furthermore, during the 
whole period of hostilities (1992-1994), there were several attempts to mediate a ceace-fire 
agreement between republican leaders by international envoys. OCSE attemps to negotiate peace 
between two republics started gaining power in 1992. UN SC passed four resolutions 
(822,853,874.884) on the matter in 1993, where it called on both sides to cease hostilities and 
condemned occupation by armenian forces, demanding “immediate withdrawal of all occupying 
forces”155. Furthermore HRW report emphasized that between 1988 and 1994 an estimated 
750,000-800,000 Azeris were forced out of NK, Armenia and seven other Azeri provinces now 
occupied
156
.   
All these facts point out, in author’s opinion, to the existence of IAC between concerned 
States in the period of 1992-1994. While at the beginning, all activities were underground in 
Armenia, nevertheless from 1993 open participation of Armenian Army forces was proved. In 
this way it is possible to discern criteria of overall control, for classifying the conflict as 
international, which is expressed through financing, provision of weapons, training of militiamen 
and general control by Armenia at the first stage of occupation. Further on, through the 
development of the conflict, these underground activities smoothly transformed into an open 
participation from 1993.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
152
 Ibid, p.120-123. 
153
 Ibid, p.125. 
154
 Cornell, p.33. 
155HRW, Seven Years…, p.27,48,67,77. 
156
 Ibid, p.97. 
35 
 
Chapter 5: Rules pertaining to and the status of protected persons upon the 
changed status of armed conflict. 
It is interesting to observe how the changed nature of AC can affect the legal status of 
protected persons. In this instance it is necessary to elaborate on the rules serving protection of 
protected persons (here civilians) both during NIAC’s and IAC’s. After clarification of the rules 
of warfare and rules pertaining to the protection of civilians during any type of AC’s, it is 
possible to proceed to the matter related to the changed nature of the AC and observe the 
corresponding change in the application of the legal regime pertaining to the regulation of the 
status of protected persons. By this, determinations on the legal regulation of the status of 
protected persons, upon the changed nature of AC, will be possible.  
5.1 Developments of IHL pertaining to the protection of civilians.  
5.1.1 Customary status of the principle of distinction. 
Protection of civilians constitutes the basics of the whole field of IHL being read within 
fundamental principle of distinction between civilians and combatants, between members of 
armed forces and persons not taking active part in hostilities. This distinction is of genuine 
importance due to prohibition of any attacks against civilians and persons not taking active part 
in hostilities. Principle of distinction and prohibition of the attack against civilians was expressed 
in the rule 1 of the Customary International Humanitarian Law (CIHL), codified by ICRC, and 
established through state practice as a norm of customary international law (CIL) applicable both 
in IAC’s and NIAC’s157.  
The origins of the principle are found already in the 19
th
 century in the Lieber Code
158
, 
and in the Hague Regulations No II and IV (from 1899 and 1907). Nevertheless explicit 
stipulation on illegality of attacks against civilians and persons not directly participating in 
hostilities was done by resolutions of international organizations: UN GA Resolution 2444 
(XXIII) from 1968, UN GA Resolution 2675, entitled "Basic Principles for the Protection of 
Civilian Populations in Armed Conflicts" from 1970 and etc. 
Meanwhile legal codification of this principle was finally allocated in AP I, in Articles 
48, 51(2) and 52(2), as related to prohibition of attacks against civilians during IAC’s; and 
Article 13(2) of AP II, related to prohibition during NIAC’s. Later prohibition of attacks against 
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civilians was also laid down in the Rome Statute, in articles 8(2)(b)(i) and 8(2)(e)(i) as 
constituting a war crime within IAC’s and NIAC’s respectively.  
In practice this principle was used in the Kassem case in 1969
159
; was respected during 
conflict in the Middle East in 1973(when AP I was not adopted yet) between Egypt, Syria, Israel 
and Iraq
160
; prescribed in national legislation (national military manuals) of some States, as for 
instance Argentina’s Law of War Manual from 1989 (in respect of NIAC’s)161 and Swedish IHL 
Manual from 1991(in respect of IAC’s), where the latter manual also stipulated that principle of 
distinction, expressed in Article 48 of AP I, represent part of CIL
162
. 
All these developments indicate that principle of distinction and corresponding 
prohibition of attack against civilians and persons not engaged in hostilities, both in IAC’s and 
NIAC’s, became strongly established norms of the customary law already for the period of 1988. 
Customary status of the principle was supported by ICJ jurisprudence
163
. By this understanding 
of the concept “civilian” is necessary for realization of the mentioned principle of IHL.    
5.1.2 Definition of the concept “civilian” and rules pertaining to the protection of 
civilians. 
i) Civilian population in IAC’s. 
 The concept “civilian” was properly defined in Article 50 of AP I: “A civilian is any 
person who does not belong to one of the categories of persons referred to in Article 4A(1 
),(2),(3) and (6) of the Third Convention and in Article 43 of this Protocol. In case of doubt 
whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian…” This definition 
is expressed through negative assertion, where civilians are people who are not members of the 
armed forces of a party to a conflict nor participants in a levee en masse (whose status is 
regulated by articles mentioned above (Art.4A(1),(2),(6) of GC III and Art.43 of AP I)). 
According to ICRC, concepts of civilian, armed forces and levee en masse are mutually 
exclusive, where notion of civilian is negatively delimited by definitions of armed forces and 
levee en masse within IHL instruments
164
.   
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By “armed forces” of a party in IAC is understood all organized armed forces, groups and 
units, which are under a command responsible to that party for the conduct of its subordinates, 
i.e. armed actors showing a sufficient degree of military organization and belonging to a party to 
the conflict must be regarded as part of the armed forces.  
“Levee en masse” - all inhabitants of a non-occupied territory who, on the approach of 
the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces without having had time to 
form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws 
and customs of war
165
. “Levee en masse” is excluded from notion of civilian population, whereas 
all other persons, directly participating in hostilities on a merely spontaneous, sporadic or 
unorganized basis, regarded as civilians
166
.  
ICRC suggests that “apart from the members of the armed forces, everybody physically 
present in a territory is a civilian”167.    
ii) Civilian population in NIAC’s. 
 In NIAC’s all persons, who are not members of state armed forces or organized armed 
groups (armed forces of a non-State party with individuals whose continuous function is to take a 
direct part in hostilities ("continuous combat function")) of a party to the conflict, are civilians
168
. 
 CA 3 and AP II suggest that civilians, armed forces, and organized armed groups are 
mutually exclusive categories also in NIAC’s169.  
Within AP II (art.13) "civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general 
protection against the dangers arising from military operations" carried out by state’s "armed 
forces", "dissident armed forces", and “other organized armed groups” “unless and for such time 
as they take a direct part in hostilities”170. 
Within CA 3 concept of civilian implies “persons taking no active part in the hostilities” 
i.e. not members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict - individuals “who do not bear 
arms” on behalf of a party to the conflict171. Under armed forces here understood State armed 
                                                          
165
 GC III, Art. 4(6). 
166
 ICRC Guidance, p.25. 
167
 ICRC, Commentary on the AP’s, para.1917. 
168
 Supra note 166, p.27. 
169
 Ibid, p.28. 
170
 APII, art.1(1) and 13(1)and (3). 
171
 ICRC, Commentary to GC IV, p.40.  
38 
 
forces, dissident armed forces and other organized armed groups, where the last two are armed 
forces of non-State party, or simply organized armed groups
172
.    
State armed forces (under AP II) include both the regular armed forces and other armed 
groups or units organized under a command responsible to the State (members of the National 
Guard, customs, or police forces)
173
. Dissident armed forces constitute part of a state's armed 
forces that have turned against the government, while other organized armed groups recruit their 
members primarily from civilian population, but develop a sufficient degree of military 
organization to conduct hostilities on behalf of a party to the conflict
174
.  
 Members of organized armed groups fulfill continuous combat function (hereafter CCF), 
which does not imply de jure entitlement to combat privileges, but distinguish members of the 
organized fighting forces of a non-State party from civilians, who are directly participating in 
hostilities on a merely spontaneous, sporadic or unorganized basis. In this way CCF requires 
lasting integration into an organized armed group, acting as armed forces of a non-State party to 
an AC, where functions of individuals involve preparation, execution of acts or operations, 
amounting to direct
175
 participation in hostilities. Meanwhile individuals, who continuously 
accompany or assume support function to organized armed groups, but functionally don’t 
directly participate in hostilities (like contributing to the general war effort: private contractors, 
civilian employees accompanying state armed forces, recruiters, trainers, propagandists, persons 
dealing with purchase, manufacture and maintaining of the weapons) are not members of that 
group and remain civilians
176
.  
5.1.3 Rules pertaining to the protection of civilians. 
In this respect, general protection of civilian population and individual civilians from the 
dangers of hostilities, mainly from military operations, is represented through an absolute 
prohibition of direct attacks against civilians and reduction of incidental losses from military 
operations to the minimum possible degree
177
. In this way protection of civilians is discerned 
from CA 3, AP II (art. 13) during NIAC’s and GC IV and AP I (mainly art. 51) during IAC’s.   
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Moreover attacks, purporting to terrorize civilians, are another type of attacks inflicting 
cruel suffering, proscribed in IHL and incorporated into rule 2 of CIHL: “acts or threats of 
violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among civilian population are 
prohibited”. This rule as a norm of CIL, applicable both in IAC’s and NIAC’s, is codified in 
articles 51(2) of AP I and 13(2) of AP II
178
.  
 Nevertheless there is an overriding condition when civilians can lose their immunity from 
direct attacks, situations of direct participation in hostilities, as was expressed in numerous 
instruments mentioned above (art. 51(3) of AP I and 13(3) of AP II), which now became an 
established rule 6 of CIL, applicable both in IAC’s and NIAC’s179. Therefore it is necessary to 
elaborate on the mentioned concept of IHL (hereafter DPH).  
5.1.4 Direct participation in hostilities. 
IHL treaties do not define notion of DPH; nevertheless this concept is directly connected 
to the law of AC’s. According to ICRC, notion of DPH refers to specific acts, carried out by 
individuals, as part of the conduct of hostilities between parties to an AC. Notion of DPH is 
comprised of two elements, that of "hostilities" and that of "direct participation" therein, where 
the concept of "hostilities" refers to the (collective) resort by parties of the conflict to means and 
methods of injuring the enemy; "participation" in hostilities refers to the (individual) 
involvement of a person in these hostilities, and this involvement depending on the quality and 
degree, could be described as “direct” or “indirect” (not discussed in this paper) participation. 
The concept of DPH has the same essence for IAC’s and NIAC’s180.  
For qualification as DPH, a specific act must meet following cumulative criteria: first, the 
act should reach required threshold of harm, i.e. adversely affect to military operations or 
military capacity of a party to an AC or, inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects, 
protected against direct attacks; second, there must be a direct causation, i.e. direct causal link 
between the act and the harm, resulting either from that act, or from a coordinated military 
operation of which that act is an integral part; third, there should be belligerent nexus, i.e. the act 
must be specifically designed to directly cause required threshold of harm in support of a party to 
the conflict and to the detriment of another. In this way, belligerent nexus does not represent 
state of mind of each individual person concerned, but only relates to the objective purpose of 
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the act, independent of personal distress, preferences or mental ability of persons involved in that 
act.  Only in conjunction these three criteria constitute activities amounting to DPH
181
.   
Concept of DPH also includes measures preparatory to the execution of a specific act, 
deployment to and return from the site of execution of the act. In this way preparatory measures 
are so closely linked to the subsequent execution of a specific hostile act (since they are aiming 
to carry out a specific act) that they constitute an integral part of that act, regardless of temporal 
and geographical proximity to the site of execution of that specific act
182
. 
5.1.5 IHL developments in respect of NK conflict. 
Discussed above developments pointed out that principle of distinction and inherited 
from it protection of civilians against direct attacks and threats of violence, purporting to 
terrorize civilians, are established norms of CIL. Therefore it is clear that principle of distinction 
and inherited from it protection of civilians should apply in the situation of AC in NK. By this, 
the change in nature of NK conflict from non-international (occurring pre-1991) to international 
(post-1991) does not affect application of the principle of distinction and obligations on 
protection of civilians. Thereby, it is reasonable to conclude that, civilians as such remain 
protected against attacks of any type during the entire period of hostilities (during NIAC and 
IAC), as long as they don’t directly participate in the hostilities. In this way, respect for the rules, 
pertaining to the protection of civilians, during the whole period of the conflict is imperative.  
CA 3 is applicable from initiation of hostilities (from 1987-88), amounting to NIAC, and 
during its transition to IAC (as mentioned before, due to its customary nature and applicability in 
any type of conflict, as “elementary considerations of humanity”). It serves protection of 
civilians as “persons not taking active part in hostilities” (who are neither members of the State 
armed forces nor organized armed groups of a non-State party to the conflict). In this way CA 
3(reinforced with article 13 of AP II) represents core of the rules, pertaining to the protection of 
civilians during NIAC’s. Nonetheless, further transition of the conflict to international triggers 
application of the separate regime of law, pertaining to the regulation of IAC’s, with 
corresponding to that regime rules, pertaining to the protection of civilians. In light of these 
developments, application of the GC’s and specifically of GC IV relative to the protection of 
civilian persons in time of war, is of particular importance. In this respect, further elaboration on 
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the applicability of the conventions and particularly rules, pertaining to the protection of civilians 
in IAC’s, upon transition of the conflict in NK, is necessary.  
5.2 Legal gaps and transitional challenges? 
In the case of discussion, appearing danger is that of legal gaps upon transition of AC to 
international. While States, as part of the USSR, were bound by GC’s and AP’s (ratified in 1954 
and 1989 respectively) up to 1991, with dissolution of the Union newly emerged States 
(Azerbaijan and Armenia) declared their adherence to the treaties later on (in June 1993). In that 
respect, a threat of a gap in legal regulation is posed in relation to the hostilities, taking place in 
the period from August-December 1991 till June 1993. Therefore, it is necessary to comment on 
whether application of the GC’s was triggered due to their humanitarian nature and respective 
developments in international law, and/or whether some rules, pertaining to the protection of 
civilians in IAC’s in GC’s, are applicable due to their customary nature.    
In international legal doctrine there was developed a trend, centered on belief that there 
exist an international legal regime of state succession to humanitarian and human rights treaties - 
regime of automatic succession. The importance of this regime, according to Kamminga, lies in 
the fact that massive human rights (HR) violations almost always occur during the periods of 
political instability, which accompany State succession, or, as in the given case, in the situation 
of dissolution of the previous State and emergence of the new independent States. In such 
circumstances, there is an urgent need to know the precise extent of the international obligations, 
which are incumbent on successor States
183
. Distinction made between newly independent and 
other successor States (such as continuator States, who continue the personality of the 
predecessor State) is important, since different legal consequences flow from it: “clean slate” 
(meaning an absence or freedom from any of the treaty obligations of the predecessor State) rule 
applies to newly independent States, while principle of continuity of treaty obligations applies to 
continuator States. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties (mostly 
dedicated to newly independent States) also points out to this distinction, offering little guidance 
to other successor States, defines “newly independent State” as a successor state184, the territory 
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of which, immediately before the date of the succession of States, was a dependent territory, for 
the international relations of which the predecessor State was responsible
185
. 
5.2.1 Automatic Succession. 
The term “automatic succession” is used in international law as implied and obligatory 
succession, which occurs regardless of volition of the successor state and without any steps being 
taken by that state. Its effect consists of the transfer of treaty rights and obligations not as result 
of the will of the successor state, but on the basis of operation of international law; by this it is 
succession ipso jure and formalities, such as sending of diplomatic notes, are not required
186
. The 
idea of automatic succession was favored by W. Jenks, who pleaded that there can be no “clean 
slate” rule in respect of multilateral treaties of legislative or universal character. This idea was 
also supported by Kamminga, who found it difficult to see on what legal basis beneficiaries of 
HR, granted to them under a treaty, could be deprived of those rights simply because they have 
ended up under the jurisdiction of a successor state. This idea could be also endorsed through 
article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides that provisions, 
related to the protection of human person, contained in treaties of a humanitarian character, may 
not be terminated or suspended in response to a breach by another part.  
It was suggested that concept of automatic succession in legal theory may be based on the 
doctrine of acquired rights (meaning that private rights, among which are basic HR and 
fundamental freedoms, could be validly invoked against the successor state) which was applied 
by Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)
187
. Among international organizations ICRC 
has taken the view that a successor state is automatically bound by IHL instruments, which were 
binding on the predecessor state, unless the successor state has made a specific declaration to the 
contrary; while among UN organs prevailing opinion was of continuing applicability of HRL 
treaties to successor States
188
. Thereby, due to special status of HRL and IHL treaties, state 
succession to these treaties seems only natural
189
.  
In practice concept was applied by former Yugoslav (SFRY) countries (considered being 
newly established States), which assumed themselves bound, by virtue of State succession, to the 
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treaties, to which SFRY had been a party (they succeeded to almost all HR and humanitarian 
treaties, binding former SFRY); Czech Republic and Slovakia did the same in relation to the 
treaties of the former Czechoslovakia; and lastly while none of the former USSR members 
succeeded to HR treaties (some acceded further on), nevertheless among them Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have succeeded to the GC’s and Protocols190. 
As Kamminga concluded, State practice during 90
th
 strongly supports the view, that 
obligations arising from a HR treaty are not affected by succession of States, their continuance 
occurs ipso facto; therefore successor States are under no obligation to issue confirmations to 
anyone. The same applies in relation to humanitarian treaties. Practice, followed by former 
USSR States, in accession, rather than succession to HR treaties, and by some States to 
humanitarian treaties, is not satisfactory, because it fails to recognize the special character of HR 
and humanitarian treaties; and as well creates gaps in accountability in respect of any violations, 
occurring in the period between the moment of independence and the entry into force of the 
treaty for the successor State
191
.  
According to Rasulov, central evidentiary value (practice of treaty adherence) in 
ascertainment of customary law on state succession to humanitarian treaties is played by 
depositary records, where verbal acts, notes and declarations of the successor states are 
registered
192
. He concludes that practice of HR bodies, although some of them insisted that 
obligations under various humanitarian treaties continue automatically to bind successor states, 
viewed succession notes as constitutive acts, by that requiring manifesting and confirming their 
succession in a formal way, what means rejecting any theory of automatic succession as such 
(since two concepts of “automatic succession” and “notification of succession” are mutually 
exclusive)
193. In this way he finds support for the “clean slate” rule, even in relation to IHL and 
HRL treaties, and concludes that general custom on automatic succession (favored by 
Kamminga) in relation to treaties of humanitarian character was not established.  
Nevertheless, some of the scholars claim de facto continuity of IHL and HRL treaties, 
though formalities (such as sending of succession notes) are practically performed in treaty 
succession, States view them as mere formalities, which means that from a legal perspective they 
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continue treaties in a quasi-automatic mode. This is mainly related to law-making treaties, of 
which humanitarian treaties are a subclass. According to this reasoning, automatic succession to 
humanitarian treaties can start as a matter of convenience, however at some stage, because every 
state chooses to continue its humanitarian treaties, some successor states will start to believe that 
they are under a legal duty to succeed; what would bring into existence Kamminga’s model194. 
Moreover, Rasulov pointed out that regional custom, favoring Kamminga’s model, i.e. 
succession to humanitarian and HR treaties, was in formation in Eastern Europe.  
Rasulov pointed out that the idea of automatic succession to humanitarian treaties, 
strengthened by the doctrine of “acquired rights”, possess enough legitimacy to be incorporated 
into positive international law
195
. This idea was also supported by Mullerson in relation to new 
states, emerging as a result of dissolution of a previous state, who stated that there is a very 
strong argument in favor of their (new states) succession to universal as well as regional 
multilateral HR and humanitarian instruments, since those treaties contain not only reciprocal 
commitments of states, but also rights and freedoms of individuals under their jurisdiction, which 
constitute in a sense “acquired rights” that states are not free to take away. The non-participation 
of successor states in IHL and HRL treaties, signed by their predecessors, would leave the 
populations of these countries without the protection they had formerly enjoyed
196
. As he 
concludes, a change of circumstances, resulting from succession, usually does not affect 
universal treaties, which codify CIL; new states simply forced, by the very fact of becoming 
members of the international community of states, to adhere to such treaties, if not formally, as 
new states usually do, then at least to follow informally treaty rules in their relations with other 
states
197
. 
Human Rights Committee (HRC) in 1992 took a position, suggesting that, when a state 
party to the Covenant has disintegrated, new states forming on that same territory remain bound, 
within their respective territories, by obligations of the Covenant. The Committee expressed the 
view that successor states were automatically bound by obligations under HR instruments from 
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the respective date of independence, and that observance of the obligations should not depend on 
a declaration of confirmation, made by the government of the successor state
198
.  
In practice concept of “automatic succession” was applied by ICTY jurisprudence, when 
Appeals Chamber (AC(h)) in Celebici case stated “irrespective of any findings as to formal 
succession, Bosnia and Herzegovina would in any event have succeeded to the {GC’s} under 
customary law, as this type of convention entails automatic succession, i.e., without the need for 
any formal confirmation of adherence by the successor State. It may be now considered in 
international law that there is automatic state succession to multilateral humanitarian treaties in 
the broad sense, i.e., treaties of universal character which express fundamental human rights…” 
where “it is indisputable that the {GC’s} fall within this category of universal multilateral 
treaties which reflect rules accepted and recognized by the international community as a whole… 
In light of the object and purpose of the {GC’s}, which is to guarantee the protection of certain 
fundamental values common to mankind in times of {AC}, and of the customary nature of their 
provisions, the Appeals Chamber is in no doubt that State succession has no impact on 
obligations arising out from these fundamental humanitarian conventions…”199. 
 Judge Shahabuddeen in his separate opinion pointed out that humanitarian nature of a 
treaty (in the case it was Genocide Convention), together with its humanitarian objects and 
purposes, creates a judicial mechanism, in which successor states made party to a humanitarian 
treaty by virtue of the adherence of the predecessor state. Moreover the break in protection, 
which arises as a result of absence of automaticity in treaty succession, would be incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the humanitarian treaties, which safeguard fundamental rights and 
freedoms of an individual and endorse the most elementary  principles of morality
200
.  
Judge Weeramantry in his separate opinion in the same case emphasized that according 
to the contemporary principles of international law there is an automatic State succession to the 
IHL and HRL treaties (as those treaties should be exempted from clean slate principle), of which 
Genocide Convention is a part, and there is no doubt for the automatic succession to those 
treaties, as international community has a special interest in their continuity
201
. Furthermore, 
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humanitarian treaties cannot be suspended during times of internal unrest, accompanying the 
break-up of a State, when they are needed most
202
.  
⃰⃰⃰⃰⃰   ⃰⃰⃰   ⃰⃰⃰  
Through the reference to various scholarly opinions on the concept of automatic 
succession, it is author’s opinion that the notion is progressively developed in international law 
(in theory, among different scholars, in practice as propounded by Courts and HRC) and 
possesses enough legitimacy (even considered contemporary principle of international law 
among some scholars) to be applicable in NK conflict. It is of particular necessity in the 
circumstances of the ongoing AC, since without automatic succession to GC’s there would be a 
gap, caused by break up of old political regime of USSR and emergence of the new regime of the 
corresponding states, in the protection enjoyed by civilians and all other protected persons. This 
gap can lead to the environment, where most flagrant violations of the fundamental HR occur, 
leaving all violent acts unaddressed. Moreover, among some countries of the former USSR 
succession in relation to the GC’s took place, therefore, in my opinion, it is reasonable to 
consider the same practice as the most pertinent for the countries at discussion, as part of the 
process of formation of a regional custom, since the similar process of formation of the regional 
custom on automatic succession occurred in Eastern Europe.  
Moreover, provisions of the GC’s, pertaining to the protection of civilians, are customary 
in nature (in author’s opinion), given their inheritance from the customary principle of distinction 
between civilians and members of armed forces, and, therefore, should be safeguarded and 
applied, regardless of any formal confirmations. In this way, it is my opinion that there was not a 
gap in the protection enjoyed by civilians, since it is unclear on what ground protection, 
exercised formerly, can cease with the transformation of political regime, particularly in the 
circumstances of the origin of those protective rules from customary principle of international 
law.   
 
5.2.2 Legal status of the protected persons in IAC’s. 
In IAC’s protection of civilians is regulated by GC IV; therefore it is necessary to point 
out how it defines protected persons. Article 4 defines protected persons as “those who, at a 
given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or 
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occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not 
nationals”203.   
ICRC distinguished two main types of the civilian population, to whom Article 4 renders 
its protection. The first category - persons of enemy nationality living in the territory of a 
belligerent State, i.e. persons of foreign nationality in relation to the belligerent states population 
nationality; second category- the inhabitants of the occupied territories, persons who are not of 
the same nationality as the occupying Power
204
. 
 
5.2.3 The factual circumstances of the conflict and rules pertaining to the protection 
of the protected persons. 
Application of the CA 3 is uncontested in relation to the hostilities taking place in 
1987(88) -1992, as being internal in nature, and further on in relation to post 1991 hostilities (due 
to its customary nature). Nevertheless the cornerstone of discussion is the rules, pertaining to the 
protection of civilians, once the conflict changed its nature to international, thus rules which are 
contained in the GC IV. In order to apply provisions of the GC IV we need to observe how 
article 4 (defining protected persons) is comparable with the case of NK conflict.  
The conflict in its international phase was signified by occupation process of NK region 
and territories neighboring with it by Armenian armed forces. This occupation resulted in the 
displacement of the ethnic Azeri population from those respective territories, as they fled upon 
attack by Armenian forces or on their approach to the cities and villages. Consequently, 
Armenian power was established in NK and neighboring territories occupied, with no ethnic 
Azeri civilian population presented in those areas, with the only civilians left - Azerbaijani 
citizens (or nationals) of Armenian ethnicity. In this situation article 4 of the GC IV, technically, 
is applicable to those ethnic Armenian civilians with Azeri citizenship (since formally they are 
inhabitants of the occupied territory of different “nationality” in respect of occupying power).  
Nevertheless, as propounded by ICTY, it is necessary to delve further into the object and 
purpose of article 4, to provide the maximum possible extent of protection, where in the Tadic 
AC(h) stipulated that nationality is not regarded as crucial and applicability of the article 4 
should not be bound with purely formal and legal relations “…ethnicity rather than nationality 
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may become determinative of national allegiance. Under these conditions, the requirement of 
nationality is even less adequate to define protected persons….allegiance to a Party to the 
conflict …may be regarded as the crucial test”205.The chamber concluded that though 
perpetrators and victims (being of different ethnicity) nominally possessed the same nationality 
(were citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina), since victims  did not owe allegiance to the State on 
behalf of which the perpetrators were acting, they enjoyed protection under article 4 of the GC 
IV
206
.  In the case of discussion we can apply propounded formula in reversed way: though 
formally perpetrators (Armenian armed forces) and victims (ethnic Armenian civilians, 
possessing Azeri citizenship) were of different nationality, ethnic Armenian residents of NK are 
not to be considered protected under article 4, because despite their formal Azeri nationality, 
their ethnicity meant that they in fact did owe allegiance to Armenia. Hence application of the 
article 4 in relation to ethnic Armenian civilians is not relevant, whereas application of the article 
in relation to Azeri ethnic population requires consideration.   
Upon occupation all ethnic Azeri civilians fled from the region and neighboring 
territories and found shelter in other parts of Azerbaijan. Referring back to the mentioned above 
categories of civilians, protected under article 4, we can see that they did not fall under second 
category of the protected persons, since they escaped the occupying regime, established later in 
the territories occupied; in regard of the first category, they were formally and ethnically Azeri 
nationals, therefore did not belong to the “enemy nationality” on the belligerent’s State territory 
(Azerbaijan was a belligerent State since armed hostilities were taking place there). Therefore 
ethnic Azeri civilians also did not fall under protection enjoyed under article 4 of the GC IV.  
In light of these circumstances, I am inclined to conclude that upon escalation of the AC 
to international, article 4 was applicable neither to ethnic Armenian civilians in the occupied 
zone nor to the ethnic Azeri civilians.  
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Conclusion. 
The research question of this thesis was “whether the change in the status of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh armed conflict from non-international to international meant for the status of 
protected persons affected by that change?” In order to answer this question the thesis was 
divided into two parts with corresponding five chapters. The first part (first four chapters) 
discussed the nature of legal regulation of the NK AC. The discussion developed in the manner 
of comparison of international legal tenets of the AC’s existing today in the field of IHL in 
respect to NK conflict. Conclusions were made on the nature of the conflict for particular periods 
of its development, pointing out that at first it started as NIAC and possessed necessary elements 
in order to qualify as NIAC, required today in IHL, and later on, with collapse of USSR, the 
conflict qualified as IAC. Part two (the last chapter) provided discussion on whether the changed 
nature of the AC affected the status of protected persons. This analysis was presented in the 
discussion of the rules pertaining to the protection of civilians as during NIAC’s and IAC’s, 
existing today within customary and conventional IHL, what correspondingly triggered 
elaborations on the concept of civilians in both types of conflicts.  One of the central themes of 
this chapter was discussion on whether conventional rules of IHL applied in the period of 
transition of the conflict, where reference was given to the concept of automatic succession to 
treaties. Author’s conclusions were that this concept was valid in respect of NK conflict.  
In the process of this research the ultimate conclusion appeared that the change in the 
nature of NK conflict did not meant for any change in the status of the protected persons. 
Although it was provided that upon transition of the conflict from NIAC to IAC application of 
the GC’s was valid, in the further analysis it was revealed that protected persons in this conflict 
did not fall under category of protected persons of GC IV. In this way, civilians remained 
protected under CA 3, once triggered upon initiation of NIAC, and continued to enjoy protection 
under named article upon transitional changes in the region due to its humanitarian nature. By 
this civilians or persons not taking active part in the hostilities should have been protected by CA 
3 from the attacks and threats of attacks, aiming at spreading terror, as inherited from the 
principle of distinction, as proscribed in paragraph (1)(a) of the article in its prohibition of 
violence to life and person…, and cruel treatment. Nevertheless this article was blatantly 
disregarded and constantly violated during both stages of conflict during - NIAC and IAC, 
causing casualties and massive flow of refugees particularly on Azeri side.  
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